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ABSTRACT 
 
Clay Pfeifler:  An Analysis of Student-Athlete Welfare-Related Expenses in NCAA Power 5 
Athletic Departments 
(Under the direction of Barbara Osborne) 
 
 
 Today, the NCAA’s pillar of amateurism is under attack and the debate over paying players 
wields fierce advocates on both sides. Are athletes exploited by a greedy NCAA, or are they the 
beneficiaries of tremendous opportunity? Absent in the debate is an illustration of actual expenses 
related to athlete well-being. This study surveyed Power 5 institutions on 2016-17 expenses across 
eight defined categories related to athlete welfare. Twenty-one institutions indicated that an 
average of about $29.9 million, or 29.5% of total athletics expenses, go towards those categories. 
Departments spend an average of $58,840 per athlete across those categories, and this study 
estimates that a full out-of-state athletic scholarship at is valued at an average of $78,045 annually. 
With greater detail than done before, this study provides a grounded expense analysis for use in 
discussion and policy-making related to student-athlete well-being, compensation, and any pay-
for-play model within the Power 5.  
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
 
 Although the commercialization of college athletics has recently gained visibility and 
commentary in the public forum, commercialization is as old as college athletics itself, with the 
first competition of college athletics, a crew race in 1852 featuring Harvard and Yale, being 
sponsored by the Boston, Concord, and Montreal Railroad (Smith, 2011; Sobocinski, 1996). Since 
that day, questions surrounding athlete compensation and the role of commercialized sport within 
the mission of higher education have persisted.  
Intercollegiate athletics stakeholders have long argued over proper compensation for the 
athletes that compete in sports that garner institutional revenue. Perceptions of these athletes range 
from modern indentured servants playing under the NCAA’s monopoly to highly compensated 
students receiving excessively lavish treatment (Osborne, 2014; Porto, 2016). For all the media 
attention and public commentary surrounding big-time athletic programs, it is critical to 
understand just how much of athletic department funds are directed towards categories that 
improve athlete health, safety, and well-being.   
 
Purpose of Study 
 
 The purpose of this research is to evaluate the amount of athletic department expenses that 
are directed towards categories which improve athlete health, safety, and well-being, both as a 
proportion of total expenses and on a per-athlete basis, as well as to provide an estimate of the 
value of a full scholarship. This study provides a valuable quantitative addition to the philosophical 
2 
 
discussions that have surrounded athlete well-being and the debate of a Pay-for-Play model in 
college athletics. 
 
Research Questions  
 
RQ #1: How much do Power 5 athletic departments spend across categories primarily focused on 
athlete health, safety, and well-being? What percentage of total expenses does this sum represent? 
RQ #2: What is the average of total welfare-related expenses per athlete? 
RQ #3: What is the relationship between total athlete count, total expenses, and various welfare 
spending metrics? How might these relationships predict welfare spending? 
RQ #4: Using expenses to estimate value, what is the approximate value of being a full scholarship 
athlete in the Power 5? 
RQ #5: How are welfare-related expenses related to an institution’s finish in the Director’s Cup? 
 
Significance of Study 
 
 In the realm of big-time college athletics, where intense media coverage and critique can 
illuminate or distort reality, this study seeks to separate the signal from the noise by examining the 
current financial realities of providing for athlete well-being. Much of the debate surrounding the 
paying of college athletes carries emotionally charged arguments from a variety of perspectives. 
Often lacking in this debate is a grounded illustration of how athletic department funds are spent 
to improve the student-athlete experience. This study is not meant to argue for or against a Pay-
for-Play model’s philosophical merits, but rather to paint a realistic image of how Power 5 athletic 
programs devote their budgets towards categories related to athlete health, safety, and well-being. 
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To that end, this study aims to provide administrators and Power 5 policy-makers with clear and 
concise data that can be useful in evaluations or discussions related to athlete compensation.  
Definition of Terms 
 
1. Power 5 – The five conferences within the NCAA capable of passing autonomy 
legislation for the purpose of enhancing athlete well-being. These conferences include 
the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), the Big 12 Conference, the Big Ten Conference, 
the Pacific 12 Conference (Pac-12), and the Southeastern Conference (SEC).  
2. Full Scholarship – a Full Grant-in-Aid agreement between the university and the 
student-athlete to cover the full cost of attendance. This includes tuition and fees, 
books, room and board, and the added expenses of attending as determined by the 
university registrar’s office.  
3. Cost of Attendance (COA) – Defined by the NCAA as an amount calculated by the 
financial aid office, using federal regulations, that includes tuition and fees, room and 
board, books and supplies, transportation, and other expenses related to attending the 
institution.  
4. Institution – For the purpose of this study, a college or university that is a member of 
the NCAA. 
5. Revenue Sport – Men’s Basketball and Football, which are traditionally the sports 
responsible for generating intense public interest and subsequent revenue.  
6. Welfare Expense Categories – for the sake of this study, this term, “well-being 
expenses” or “welfare expenses” simply refer to the defined categories included in the 
study that make up the total expenses considered for athlete health, safety, and well-
being. (i.e. Athletic Aid; Meals and other Nutrition; Medical/Insurance and other 
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Athletic Training and Sports Medicine expenses; Academic Support, Equipment, 
Uniforms, and Supplies; Student-Athlete Development; Team Travel; and Strength and 
Conditioning) 
7. Non-Aid Welfare Expenses – All the welfare categories listed above except the 
amount for Athletic Aid. 
8. Athletic Aid – All scholarship related expenses covered by university based on athletic 
ability. This excludes external academic scholarships and federal Pell Grant awards. 
Included in this figure is all aid paid to or on behalf of college athletes including 
amounts for tuition, fees, books, room, board, and additional aid up to the university-
defined cost of attendance.  
9. EADA Unduplicated Count – A count of student-athletes submitted by institutions to 
the U.S. Department of Education in compliance with the Equity in Athletics 
Disclosure Act. The data used in this study subtracts any male practice players listed 
within the institution’s unduplicated count. This includes all athletes, including walk-
ons, subject to a few reporting standards. This figure is used as the number of athletes 
at the institution. 
 
Limitations 
 
1. This study is limited to the extent that university financial records deviate or differ from 
actual values based on differences in accounting methods, survey interpretation, and 
included expenses or revenues, which may vary greatly from institution to institution.  
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2. This study is limited in that the defined expense categories requested may include 
expenses that are linked at least partially to university motivations not directly related 
to athlete health, safety, and well-being.  
3. Not all expenses that directly impact athlete health, safety, and well-being can be 
efficiently requested through the survey instrument. For efficiency, the defined 
categories serve as reasonably accurate markers of expenses of related categories, but 
smaller welfare-related expenses included within separate expense accounts are not 
included in the analysis (e.g. event security expenses that would be considered an event 
management or overhead expense, software for tracking student-athlete time demands 
that would be considered an administrative expense, student-athlete reimbursements 
from the SAF fund, and various individual team expenses that would come out of their 
sport operating budget) 
4. This study does not consider a large expanse of indirect or long-term benefits received 
through participation in college athletics, namely emotional, cognitive, and 
psychological benefits, the enhanced marketability to employers, potential special 
admission to the university, the value of leadership development programs, and access 
to elite training facilities and coaching for the purposes of playing professionally. These 
valuable potential benefits are subjective and difficult to measure.   
5. This study looks at the athlete population as a whole, and does not attempt to estimate 
the expenses directed towards any individual sport’s athletes.  
6. Expenses by the institution do not always equate to benefits for athletes, even within 
athlete welfare-related categories. This may particularly be the case with personnel 
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salaries. Not every dollar of expense is equal in its benefit to athletes; certain expenses 
are more efficient in benefitting the athlete than others.  
7. Some welfare-related costs borne by the institution within these categories may be 
excluded from the athletics expenses if they are managed separately by the institution 
or funded separately by a corporate sponsor.  
8. As expenses requested only include ongoing support personnel and some operating 
expenses, this study does not account for differences in facility quality across sports or 
across institutions. For example, the difference between the most elite training center 
and an average training center would be mostly uncaptured. 
 
Assumptions 
 
1. It is assumed that the figures received through the survey instrument from university 
athletic department officials themselves are materially accurate. 
2. It is assumed that there is no overlap of expenses submitted across categories, i.e. that 
expenses potentially applying to multiple categories were only included in one, with that 
category being the NCAA-defined category where applicable.  
3. This study assumes that the defined welfare expense categories are reasonably accurate 
markers of spending towards athlete health, safety, and welfare. 
4. This study essentially assumes that total athletics expense is equal to total athletics revenue, 
as institutions are generally spending very close to the amount of revenue they generate. 
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CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 In examining the current scope of benefits for college athletes, it is important to understand 
the historical evolution of college athletics, athletic scholarships, and athlete benefits, as well as 
the current debate over paying college athletes and applicable legal cases. This review looks to 
provide context for the research and its place in the national discussion over paying college 
athletes.   
 
Evolution of Athletic Scholarships  
 
College athletics has grown as a commercial enterprise despite waves of reform efforts in 
virtually every decade since its creation (Smith, 2011). The institutional, conference-level, and 
NCAA regulations, practices and philosophies surrounding financial aid to athletes fluctuated 
significantly from the beginning and continue to evolve today. 
When intercollegiate athletics programs began, activities were governed and financed by 
student organizations, with compensation paid by the team’s student leaders from funds raised and 
gate receipts (Noll, 2013). With revenues outpacing expenses in some sports, namely rowing, in 
the mid-to-late 19th century, financial prizes for winning became common (Noll, 2013). Late in 
the 19th century, universities sought to take control over athletic programs from the students, often 
in faculty-lead attempts to reform the role of athletics in student life. With this, college athletics 
soon grew to be governed by conferences of like-minded institutions, with the conferences acting 
mostly independent of each other (Smith, 2011). Following an injury-laden 1905 football season, 
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pressure from President Theodore Roosevelt to address safety in college football led to the creation 
of what is now the NCAA, with the original purpose of reforming football, standardizing rules, 
and improving safety (Noll, 2013; Smith, 2011). Roosevelt broadly encouraged athletes to 
maintain an amateur status (Gibson, 2012).  
For the early part of its existence, the NCAA merely recommended policy, and as an 
organization formed by smaller, less powerful institutions, it held very little authority over the 
athletic powerhouses at the time (Smith, 2011). The core of the NCAA, just as it is today, was that 
the institutions themselves have autonomy, a notion called the Home Rule principle (Smith, 2011) 
now known as Institutional Autonomy (NCAA Manual, 2016). Though the NCAA adopts 
regulations, the institution is responsible for acting in compliance with those regulations. Because 
of the NCAA’s lack of legislative authority, the association was largely a forum for discussion 
until the second half of the 20th century (Byers, 1995; Smith, 2011).  
The 1920’s saw a massive buildup of football stadiums and coach salaries across the nation 
as football games commonly attracted crowds of 50-, 60-, and 70-thousand spectators (Smith, 
2011). In 1929, the Carnegie Foundation released a report based on a three-year study of college 
athletics: a scathing review of the commercialized and professional state of the industry wherein 
85% of the college respondents said they paid athletes in some form (Byers, 1995; Noll, 2013; 
Smith, 2011).  
Widespread concern over the recruitment and compensation of athletes mounted in the 
1930s, and was a major point of contention at almost every annual NCAA convention. While the 
1930s saw university presidents at the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Chicago, the 
University of North Carolina, and the University of Pennsylvania attempt to reform the 
commercial and professional nature of college athletics, efforts failed to bring change on the 
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national level (Smith, 2011). In 1931, the President of the University of Pennsylvania, Thomas S. 
Gates, released what would be known as the Gates Plan to address the growing professionalism in 
college sports. Among other things, Gates called for the abolition of athletic dorms and the free 
training table provided to athletes, as well as a substantial reduction in the power of football within 
the university. Like other reform-minded presidents, Gates pushed to end the proactive recruitment 
of athletes, and to distribute financial aid strictly based on need. While his reforms were successful 
at the University of Pennsylvania, his efforts in pushing similar reforms nationally through the 
Association of American Colleges (AAC) and the AAC-created Commission on College Athletics 
failed to find substantial likeminded support (Smith, 2011).  
A few months after the recently formed Southeastern Conference (SEC) voted to permit 
aid, limited to expenses, purely based on athletic ability, the Southern Conference accepted 
reforms in 1936 from the University of North Carolina’s President Graham to eliminate such aid 
based on athletic ability (Smith, 2011). Students and alumni bitterly opposed Graham’s plan from 
the start, and in 1938, the Southern Conference formally changed their ban of athletic scholarships, 
which had been disregarded in practice by conference members, allowing athletic scholarships if 
they came from and were managed by outside supporters. This created the formal opening for 
alumni booster organizations, such as the Educational Foundation, formed by UNC alumni shortly 
thereafter (Smith, 2011). Just as the Southern Conference changed course over the decade, the 
SEC banned athletic scholarships in 1933, then reversed course in 1936 to allow athletic aid 
covering tuition, fees, room, board, and books if the student-athlete met the same academic 
requirements as other students (Noll, 2013).  
At the 1939 NCAA convention, the NCAA passed an amendment to the constitution to 
address financial aid, their first attempt to do so (Smith, 2011; Noll, 2013). In contrast to 
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conference rules, the NCAA called for all financial aid to be based on need, rather than athletic 
ability, and for all aid to be administered through the university, banning aid from alumni and 
external groups (Smith, 2011). Nonetheless, enforcement of the code remained the responsibility 
of presidents and administrators, and despite being noble in intent, the NCAA lacked the resources 
to investigate violators (Smith, 2011).  
The 1940s saw a surge in scholarship inducements for potential football recruits as veterans 
returned from World War II (Byers, 1995; Gibson, 2012). With a recruiting frenzy on their hands 
and the NCAA lacking any means for enforcement, schools looked to attract athletes through 
nearly any compensatory means necessary (Byers, 1995; Gibson, 2012; Noll, 2013). In 1941, the 
SEC increased scholarships to cover laundry and medical care, with separate meals for athletes 
prohibited. Again in 1946, the SEC increased scholarships to pay for incidental expenses of $10 
per month (Noll, 2013). Additionally, it had become common practice, specifically in the Big Ten, 
to compensate athletes with essentially nonexistent jobs (Gibson, 2012; Noll, 2013). As part of the 
40s recruiting frenzy, the Big Ten joined the trend and allowed athletic scholarships for athletes 
meeting institutional academic standards, similar to the 1936 SEC policy (Noll, 2013).  
Those schools facing a recruiting disadvantage, be it in university prestige or facilities, 
turned to athletic grants-in-aid to offer what the major schools had not, a free education (Gibson, 
2012). One example of this was Michigan State. When John Hannah became president of Michigan 
State in 1941, the university had an enrollment of 6,000 and a yearly budget of $4 million (Byers, 
1995). Back in the 30s and 40s, scholarships were viewed purely within the context of academic 
merit. With a $500,000 gift from a local insurance company executive, Hannah used the money to 
fund athletic scholarships in an attempt to best the University of Michigan (Byers, 1995). With 
political skill, social maneuvering, and a convenient locational fit for the conference, Hannah 
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earned Michigan State a spot in the Big Ten conference in 1949, replacing the University of 
Chicago (Byers, 1995). While Chicago’s enrollment declined following its departure, twenty years 
later the “cow college” Michigan State became a massive, 40,000-student university with a budget 
over $100 million (Byers, 1995). The rise of Michigan State was a testament to the power of 
athletics to grow the university, and an illustration to university officials of the return on 
investment athletics could have. 
In 1946, conference leaders, namely the dominant Big Ten conference, produced the 
Principles of Conduct of Intercollegiate Athletics, citing the ideal of amateurism, meaning that 
athletes should only be given scholarships based on non-athletic qualifications (Gibson, 2012; 
Oriard, 2012). From this, the Sanity Code was created in 1948 as part of the NCAA Constitution. 
The 1948 Sanity Code attempted to limit the growing practice of offering full athletic scholarships, 
but self-reporting failed as a means of enforcement (Byers, 1995). Despite trying to end the 
practice of full athletics aid, the Sanity Code did allow meals during team travel, training table, 
and medical care. The University of Virginia was the leader in fighting back against the Sanity 
Code, claiming full scholarships for football players was essential. When a vote to expel the lead 
violator, Virginia, and six others from the NCAA for violations of the code failed to meet the two-
thirds threshold (it garnered 54%), the Sanity Code effectively died (Byers, 1995). Being 
competitive in big time football and earning a piece of the revenue pie was simply too compelling 
(Gibson, 2012). From this failed first attempt at national regulation, the NCAA reorganized and 
expanded its authority for enforcement. Supporters of the Sanity Code would go on to coin the 
phrase “pay for play” to describe the developing grant-in-aid system (Byers, 1995).  
The NCAA would slowly evolve from a toothless voluntary association to an authoritative 
governing body by the 1950s (Gibson, 2012). By the early 1950s, just about every major school in 
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college football outside of the Ivy League was offering full grants-in aid (Gibson, 2012). With 
these full scholarships common nationally, the NCAA’s members decided to formally recognize 
the practice in 1956, standardizing the agreement and the guidelines for distribution with the goal 
of cutting down on booster payments (Byers, 1995; Gibson, 2012). These grants-in-aid were to 
cover all “commonly accepted educational expenses” and were defined a year later as tuition, fees, 
room and board, books, and $15 per month for incidental expenses (Smith, 2011; Noll, 2013; 
Byers, 1995). This scholarship structure has remained largely unchanged ever since. 
From here, the race to fund scholarships through alumni donations began (Byers, 1995). 
Despite the attempt to preserve the ideal of amateurism and cut down on booster payments, the 
off-the-book outside payments continued. At the time, the bulk of college scholarships paid for 
tuition and fees and offered a job that would cover room and board (Byers, 1995). While the Big 
Ten attempted to resist the grant-in-aid phenomenon, it reluctantly gave in five years later for 
competitive reasons, offering full grants-in-aid starting in the 1961-62 season (Byers, 1995). Full 
grants-in-aid expanded to include reimbursements for “actual and necessary” travel expenses and 
explicitly permitted benefits including insurance and academic support (Noll, 2013).  
In the 1960s, student-athlete income based on “fame or reputation” – essentially name, 
image, and likeness – was banned by the NCAA. The debate over athlete rights to such income 
has gone on ever since, leading to a 2009 class action lawsuit against the NCAA and Electronic 
Arts (EA) on behalf of football and men’s basketball players featured in EA Sports video games 
(Keller v. Elec. Arts., 2013). The case ultimately settled in 2014, but the debate over athlete rights 
to monetize their own name, image, and likeness continues on.  
The 1970s brought significant change in the landscape of intercollegiate athletics. In 1972, 
Title IX of the Educational Amendments was passed (see Section III), and in 1973, the NCAA 
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federated into three divisions: I, II, and III.  In 1978, Division I football subdivided further into 1-
A and 1-AA, which would become the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) and the Football 
Championship Subdivision (FCS) (Smith, 2011). This was the first move in separating the big-
time athletic programs, the “haves,” from the “have nots.” 
In 1976, an NCAA proposal to make financial need the deciding factor for additional aid 
beyond tuition lost narrowly, 120 to 102. A similar proposal resurfaced in 1981 for Division I and 
was defeated 148-101 (Byers, 1995). However, the NCAA made a multitude of changes to 
scholarships at the 1976 Convention, largely for the purpose of reducing costs, including 
implementing a cap on total scholarship numbers, the number of athletes receiving aid – “counters” 
– in football and basketball (Byers, 1995; Gibson, 2012; Noll, 2013; Teich, 2016). Other sports 
would have scholarship numbers limited to a divisible number of full scholarships, called 
“equivalencies” (Noll, 2013; NCAA Manual, 2016). Archival research from the NCAA 
conventions conducted by Kantor (2016) revealed that the “head count” designation came from an 
effort to separate football and basketball from the other sports, with four women’s sports – 
basketball, tennis, volleyball, and gymnastics – gaining the designation from a 1982 vote (Kantor, 
2016). The different classifications were due, in part, to “the need of a sport for team limit by 
position or event, the particular popularity of the sport in terms of visibility and the consequences 
of stockpiling” (Kantor, 2016; NCAA Convention Proceedings, 1982, p.108).  
Additionally, the NCAA changed the definition of “commonly accepted educational 
expenditures” to exclude school supplies and the previous allowance for “incidental expenses” 
(Noll, 2013). This shift created a gap between the maximum grant-in-aid amount allowed and the 
actual cost of attendance (Noll, 2013), a difference that would not be addressed again until the 
autonomy legislation in 2015.  
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In 1977, the NCAA allowed student-athletes to receive Basic Educational Opportunity 
Grants (now Pell Grants), primarily for the purpose of reducing aid coming from the institution 
dollar-for-dollar to the extent that the NCAA aid limit had been reached (Byers, 1995; Noll, 2013). 
A year later, the NCAA also voted to allow athlete compensation from the United States Olympic 
Committee (Noll, 2013).  
Pell Grants are federal educational grants meant to assist students from lower-income 
families with the financial burden of attending college. The Pell Grant system is designed to aid 
those with the greatest financial need, with those in greater need being eligible for higher grant 
amounts. In 1982, the NCAA voted to allow the athlete to keep $900 of the then-maximum $1,800, 
with the other half of the $1,800 reducing the player’s grant-in-aid from the university. This, in a 
way, was a compromise by the NCAA to allow students with the most financial need to receive 
some additional money, but also allow the university to save money they would have paid. The 
Pell Grant limit was not without its detractors, including University of Kansas track coach Bob 
Timmons, who called it “Robin Hood in reverse.” He noted that those athletes who qualify for the 
grant are not allowed to keep all of it, and the excess goes to other athletes who come from 
backgrounds fortunate enough so as to have not qualified for the grant (Byers, 1995; Noll, 2013). 
The limit of $900 has increased as the maximum Pell Grant amount has increased, allowing $1,700 
of the maximum $2,300 in 1990 (Byers, 1995), and $2,400 or COA by 1993, with the limits finally 
removed in 1996 (Noll, 2013). Today, Pell Grant aid is exempt from the NCAA individual 
financial aid limit, and athletic scholarships do not affect federal eligibility for Pell Grants. For the 
2016-17 academic year, the maximum federal Pell Grant award was $5,815 (Dear Colleague Letter 
GEN-16-01, 2016). Additionally, some member institutions use Pell Grant eligibility as a 
prerequisite to receiving NCAA Student Assistance Fund (SAF) aid or as a factor for receiving 
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additional SAF aid (Wolverton, 2015). In the pay-for-play debate, it is worth considering whether 
athletes would still be eligible for Pell Grants if they received a substantial income as an employee.  
The NCAA clarified which additional expenses could be provided to athletes in 1989, 
including academic support services, medical services, entertainment, room and board, travel, and 
expenses relating to friends and relatives (Noll, 2013). Since then, most changes have been to 
increase the services provided and expenses reimbursed. 
The 1990s saw an expansion of allowance for travel in relation to athletic participation or 
family emergency. In 1991, the NCAA Special Assistance Fund was created and permitted as 
financial aid (Noll, 2013).  The fund lives on today in the form of the Student Assistance Fund 
(SAF), a merger of the former Special Assistance Fund and the Student Athlete Opportunity Fund 
(SAOF) (See Section II).  
Early in 2014, the NCAA lifted restrictions on meals in Division I, effective August 2014, 
allowing member institutions significantly more freedom in providing meals, snacks, and other 
nutrition to their athletes (outside of applicable stipends for board within their grant-in-aid). Since 
then, nutrition departments across Division I have grown dramatically, with nutritional budgets 
regularly over $1 million and some even eclipsing $2 million (Collegiate & Professional Sports 
Dietitians Association, 2015).  
A series of efforts in 2011 to allow a flat $2,000 addition to the grant-in-aid limit was 
protested and eventually defeated in 2012 (Powell, 2013), but the efforts showed signs of struggle 
that would be more comprehensively addressed in 2014. Through substantial changes in the 
NCAA’s governance structure that were adopted in August 2014, five conferences received 
additional powers to create legislation dealing with specific topics, almost exclusively those 
impacting athlete well-being (NCAA, 2014). These conferences – the ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac-
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12, and SEC – became known as the autonomy conferences or the “Power 5.” In a long-expected 
move following this change, these conferences passed autonomy legislation to allow scholarships 
up to the full cost of attendance, effective August 2015, filling the previous gap between the grant-
in-aid limit and the full cost of attendance (NCAA, 2015). This move served to alleviate growing 
pressure to compensate (Huma; 2011; Noll, 2013; Oriard, 2012; Staurowsky, 2012) college 
athletes up to the cost of attendance and to deflect legal threats surrounding the antitrust lawsuit 
filed by Ed O’Bannon and the White v. NCAA lawsuit settled in 2008 (Berri, 2016; Gibson, 2012; 
Noll, 2013; Powell, 2013).  
This research provides a grounded illustration of how Power 5 institutions are currently 
reacting to these changes and events via spending across athlete welfare categories. Clearly, the 
debate over athlete compensation is not a new phenomenon, but there is no question that athlete 
compensation and the expenses devoted to these well-being-related categories have increased 
overtime and significantly within the past decade. This study provides a current snapshot of 
spending and an estimate of the full cost benefits of a full athletic scholarship in the Power 5. 
 
Athletic Scholarships Today 
 
Annually, NCAA members provide nearly $3 billion in scholarships to over 150,000 
college athletes in Divisions I and II, almost a third of the over 480,000 students competing 
throughout the NCAA’s three divisions (NCAA, 2017).  While this is substantial, the benefits to 
athletes extend far beyond the direct grant-in-aid benefits, which have consistently increased over 
time in a wide variety of athlete welfare-related categories. This section will review the NCAA’s 
bylaws that shape financial aid and benefits and discuss recent developments in academic support, 
nutrition, and the Special Assistance Fund (SAF).  
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Financial aid is addressed at length in Bylaw 15 of the NCAA Manual, which includes 
policies on amounts, limits, distribution, per-sport limits, employment, permissible and 
impermissible aid, and more. Each sport has different NCAA-wide limits on scholarships and some 
sports have a limit on participants. Six sports are considered “head-count” sports, whereby each 
member receiving any athletics aid counts as a full scholarship against their sport’s limit; therefore 
most schools provide a full grant-in-aid for each athlete up to the team limit (NCAA Manual, 
2016). These sports and their counter limits are football (85), men’s basketball (13), women’s 
basketball (15), volleyball (12), women’s gymnastics (12), and women’s tennis (8). The remaining 
sports are “equivalency” sports, meaning individual sports are limited to a set value for financial 
awards and are free to distribute the scholarships across athletes how the coach sees fit (NCAA 
Manual, 2016).  
Presently, a full grant-in-aid agreement covers tuition and fees, room and board, books, 
and the additional costs of attending, as published by each institution (NCAA Manual, 2016). 
Certain types of aid, including Pell Grants, G.I. Bill grants, federal welfare benefits, and Special 
Assistance Fund (SAF) awards are exempted from the NCAA maximum limit on individual aid 
(NCAA Manual, 2016). Separate financial aid for the summer is also allowed under Section 15.2, 
subject to certain requirements. The board allowance consists of the greater of three meals per day 
or the institution’s maximum meal plan commonly available to all students. The room allowance 
can be one of the following: (1) the official on-campus room allowance, (2) the average of room 
costs of all students living on campus, or (3) the cost of a room as calculated for the cost of 
attendance figure for all students (NCAA Manual, 2016).   
The additional cost of attendance amount is an amount determined by an institution’s 
financial aid office and must be calculated through the same policies and procedures used for all 
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students of the institution. The institution may customize this figure to the circumstances of the 
person, if such adjustments are documented and available to all students in similar circumstances. 
Examples of potential adjustments include differences due to living off campus or on campus, in-
state or out-of-state residence, disability, and child care (NCAA Manual, 2016). This amount is 
meant to include additional personal expenses including travel, cell phone expenses, 
transportation, and other expenses relating to attending the institution. The athletics number can 
differ from the university number in how things are counted. For example, the University of 
Missouri includes cell phone expenses in the housing cost, while UM athletics takes that expense 
out of the housing figure and includes it in the cost of attendance figure (Toppmeyer, 2017). 
Additionally, the NCAA limits books to $800 for the denominator when calculating equivalency 
aid, but Missouri’s book costs in its federal cost of attendance figure is $1,344, so athletics adds 
the difference to the cost of attendance, creating another discrepancy between the federal cost of 
attendance figure and the athletics cost of attendance figure (Toppmeyer, 2017). In the autonomy 
conferences, the additional amount for the cost of attendance ranges from around $1,500 at some 
institutions to over $6,000 at others (Solomon, 2015), a large and partly arbitrary difference. 
Additionally, other types of support and aid may be given to athletes as noted in bylaw 16 of the 
NCAA manual, regardless of their grant-in-aid amount. These types of aid are of specific interest 
to this study, including academic support, nutrition, strength and conditioning, athletic training, 
medical expenses, and more. Clearly, institutions have a substantial range of discretion in declaring 
their cost figures for room, board, and the registrar-defined cost of attendance, while both the 
institution and the athletic department may use their discretion to make these figures higher or 
lower to serve their best interest.  
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Academic Support 
 
Academic counseling, tutoring services, and a life skills program are required by NCAA 
bylaw 16.3 to be provided to all student-athletes, while career counseling and personal 
development services are allowed. With universities accepting a substantial number of athlete 
“special admits,” students whose academic credentials alone would not merit admission to the 
university, academic support programs have increasingly devoted resources to athletes in an effort 
to keep them on par with the normal student body (Wolverton, 2008; 2016).  
Schools around the country are continually adding reading specialists, learning specialists, 
and other learning assistants to support athletes that are more underprepared than ever before 
(Wolverton, 2016). Diagnoses of learning disabilities have increased tremendously, with some 
programs like Ohio State University and Louisiana State University reporting that 20-40% of their 
football team has a learning disability. At the University of Florida, a self-reported $300,000 per 
year is spent on tutors to work with these students. As the spending boom in academic support 
continues, athletes gain a considerable direct benefit (Wolverton, 2016).  
In the late 1990’s many elite athletics programs had a minimal number of tutors available 
to athletes, but within ten years, budgets and staff numbers commonly increased fivefold, tenfold, 
or more (Wolverton, 2008). Thanks to generous athletics donors, academic support centers 
routinely costing between $7 and $15 million have popped up across the country every year, with 
Texas A&M’s academic center reportedly costing over $27 million (Wolverton, 2016). In 2016, 
the University of Louisville ($18.5 million), Penn State University ($7.2 million), the University 
of Arizona ($7.25 million), and the University of Florida ($25 million renovation) opened 
academic centers for athletes (Arizona Athletics, 2016; Carter, 2016; Greer, 2016; Penn State 
University, 2016). This study includes a quantification of current spending on tutors, academic 
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advisors, and learning specialists and other academic support-related operating expenses that 
provide a direct benefit to athletes, whose eligibility and educational outcomes may otherwise be 
threatened without such support. 
 
Nutrition  
 
Immediately following the 2014 NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament championship 
game, University of Connecticut player Shabazz Napier made comments that gained national 
attention surrounding nutrition and the NCAA’s provisions for athlete welfare. Asked about 
Northwestern football unionization attempt and paying athletes, he said, in part, “…there are 
hungry nights that I go to bed and I’m starving…and I’m not able to eat and I still got to play up 
to my capabilities” (FOX Sports, 2014; Ganim, 2014). The NCAA immediately became the subject 
of increased criticism and scrutiny regarding athlete welfare.  
In April 2014, with pressure stemming from Napier’s comments, the NCAA deregulated 
meals and nutrition within Division I, granting a substantial increase in freedom for universities to 
meet their athletes’ nutritional needs through unlimited meals, snacks, nutritional supplements, 
and “fueling stations” of all kinds (Dochterman, 2014). Training table meals, meals incidental to 
participation, and the other nutritional items are allowed under bylaw 16.5.2. Training Table meals 
are limited to one per day, but additional meals are allowed if the value is deducted from that 
student-athlete’s board allowance. The Collegiate & Professional Sports Dietitians Association 
(CPSDA) also influenced the new legislation, which had been working through the NCAA 
governance channels since 2012 and became effective August 2014 (Jessop, 2014). The CPSDA 
conducted a survey a year later, finding that Division I universities went from feeding an average 
of 368 athletes prior to the deregulation, to 569, essentially all athletes, by August 2015. 
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Additionally, the CPSDA found that food budgets increased by an average of 145% after the 
NCAA eased its restrictions. Before deregulation, the average food budget was about $530,000 
among the 23 institutions that provided budget figures. By August 2015, the average budget of the 
same institutions jumped to about $1.3 million, with 20 of the 23 sampled having a budget over 
$1 million, 11 over $1.5 million, and four over $2 million (CPSDA, 2015).  This shift has led 
institutions in Division I to ramp up nutritional expenditures, providing a considerable benefit to 
athletes, who can now have virtually all of their dietary needs met without leaving campus or 
spending their own money. Just one institutional example of this shift is the University of 
Pittsburgh, which now has 24-hour nutritional stations inside athletic facilities and smoothie 
stations in their weight rooms. There, they provide “heavy continental breakfast” buffets in 
addition to training table meals (Thomason, 2014), while others look to add or expand upon 
athlete-only dining halls and other nutritional stations (Dochterman, 2014). This study examines 
nutritional spending as a substantial direct benefit to athletes.  
 
Student Assistance Funds 
 
The Student Assistance Fund (SAF) is an additional source of exempted aid, distributed 
from the NCAA to the conferences, which then decide how to distribute the funds to member 
institutions. The fund is intended to meet needs arising from participation in intercollegiate 
athletics and academic pursuits, or to recognize achievement (Dosh, 2015). While certain uses for 
these funds like stipends, tuition, textbooks, capital improvements, and outside opportunities for 
athletes are prohibited, institutions have considerable freedom for deciding how to use these funds 
(NCAA Manual, 2016). Some common uses include loss-of-value insurance, disability insurance, 
and special travel (Herman, 2017). These versatile funds can also be used to pay for certain 
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expenses related to graduate education, trips back home, travel for family to attend events honoring 
the athlete, various emergency expenses, dental expenses, costs to attend funerals, iPads, or a 
dress/suit to use for interviews. The rarely discussed fund has an annual budget for Division I 
approaching $80 million based on 2014 data, and serves as a catch-all fund to benefit student-
athletes in case-by-case instances of need (McCoy, 2014; Dosh, 2015). SAF expenses are generally 
entirely a direct benefit to athletes, but institutions may partially use these funds to supplement 
other athlete-focused departments like Student-Athlete Development and Academic Support. 
Because these are restricted funds, like expenses provided by particular endowments, these funds 
may be partially or entirely excluded from the reported total expenses. In general, restricted funds 
must only be reported in the footnotes if there is a significant change or addition (2017 Agreed-
Upon Procedures). As some of these funds are used for other categories in this study, they are not 
included within the total expense figure for well-being but are nonetheless a significant direct 
addition to athlete well-being. 
 
Other Benefits 
 
The NCAA permits a wide range of other benefits relating to vacation period expenses, 
participation in NCAA championships, postseason bowl games, and reimbursement for actual and 
necessary expenses associated with competing in Olympic Trials, Olympic Games, and various 
other national or world competitions. As these benefits vary widely from athlete to athlete, these 
benefits will not be examined within this study.  
While athletes may receive countless other miscellaneous and indirect benefits including 
frequent flyer miles, ‘occasional’ team meals, access to world-class facilities, tremendous 
coaching, and benefits related to family travel and postseason participation, these benefits are not 
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within the scope of this study, which looks at benefits through the lens of athletic department 
expenses. Other included categories of this study focus narrowly on personnel, direct expenses, 
and operating expenses related to medical care/athletic training, strength and conditioning, team 
travel, equipment/apparel, and student-athlete development. 
 
Current Pay-for-Play Debate 
 
College athletes have always been “paid,” whether in the form of a scholarship, alumni 
inducement, under-the-table payments, or additional money for laundry or “incidental expenses”. 
The question has generally not been whether athletes deserve compensation, but whether that 
compensation should be limited below the market forces of supply and demand by institutional or 
NCAA-legislated limits. Currently, any compensation up to the amount of the cost of attendance 
fits under the principle of amateurism, but any amount over transcends into the realm of 
professional sport (Noll, 2013; Oriard, 2012; Staurowsky, 2012).  
With total athletics spending per athlete in the Power 5 regularly exceeding six to ten times 
the amount of institutional spending per student (Knight Commission, 2010), critics have often 
asked why so much money is devoted to a purpose outside the central mission of higher education 
(Dunn, 2013). The question is certainly valid, and the answer gets to the difficult underlying 
dilemma facing universities today: athletics has no comparison or substitute in building awareness 
of the university, attracting students, fostering connection and loyalty with students and alumni, 
and raising money through devoted and passionate donors (Dunn, 2013). The story of Michigan 
State’s rise illustrates this phenomenon with the clear message to universities: play the game or be 
left behind (Byers, 1995).  
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Based on societal demand and the subsequent financial incentives, for better or worse, 
football and men’s basketball are viewed as the breadwinners that have the best chances to provide 
for the rest of the university’s family of sports. Competitive success in football and men’s 
basketball is a compelling force that is one of the few avenues for lifting the profile of an entire 
institution. The role of football and men’s basketball athletes in this quest continues to be hotly 
debated (Huma & Staurowsky, 2011). Because of the intense public interest and financial 
incentives in the top tier of football and men’s basketball, the role of the athlete’s position in the 
media lies mired in between too distinct profiles: part amateur student, part professional athlete. 
For instance, in the Elite 8 of the 2017 NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament, UNC basketball 
player Luke Maye hit a last second basket to defeat Kentucky. His shot earned the ACC conference 
$264,859 that year and projects to earn the ACC about $1.7 million over the course of the next six 
annual payouts each NCAA tournament game played, or ‘unit,’ that entry into the tournament and 
each subsequent win provides (Smith, 2017). Looking just at the money and media coverage 
around the game, Luke Maye appears to be quite similar to professional players in the NBA. 
However, Luke Maye, like many college athletes often do, boarded a flight home after that 
competition and went to his 8 o’clock class, sitting in the front row, no less, about 12 hours after 
sending UNC to the Final Four (Haislop, 2017). Despite earning the ACC money, Luke Maye and 
his teammates did not receive checks for winning that game or any other game.  Aside from being 
in the center of the intensely demanded social phenomenon of college basketball, Luke Maye is 
not wildly different from other varsity athletes in different sports.  
In reviewing positions on both sides of the pay-for-play debate, advocates with conflicting 
positions tend to reference to orientations. The first, with the reference point of professional 
athletes, makes the case that these athletes help drive substantial revenue to the university, and as 
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such, should be entitled to their share of the income generated, as well as money they could earn 
from their name, image, and likeness. When viewed as professional athletes, they appear exploited 
by powerful, wealthy universities, with the relationship occasionally compared to indentured 
servitude or slavery (Blackistone, 2014; Byers, 1995; Huma & Staurowsky, 2011; Lanter & 
Hawkins, 2013; Miller, 2012; Porto, 2016; Powell, 2013; Sack, 2009). The second side, with the 
reference point of college students, argues that these players receive funding and resources that 
greatly outpace the student body, often receive special admission, and have the opportunity to 
develop and showcase their skills on a platform that allows them the opportunity to compete 
professionally. Receiving the best facilities and amenities, the highest paid coaches, and extensive 
staff support, these athletes can attend the university that they believe gives them the best chance 
of going pro or getting drafted as high as possible (Osborne, 2014; Rishe, 2011). Beyond these 
direct resources, in general, graduated athletes of all sports report higher life satisfaction, report a 
positive life impact from college athletics, are less likely to be unemployed, and have a higher 
annual income than their traditional student peers (Chalfin, Weight, Osborne & Johnson, 2015; 
Dressler, 2014). These are all realities that do not align with the narrative of exploitation.  
In breaking down the current academic debate surrounding the payment of athletes, Allen 
Sack provides a framework for categorizing three main competing philosophies. A subset of 
reformers that Allen Sack (2009) labels as “Intellectual Elitism” reformers see the current state of 
athletics and commercialism as a tremendous drain on resources and a mockery of higher 
education. They view athletics as an extracurricular activity, whereby student-athletes should 
receive little to no athletically based scholarships.  
Another subset is labeled by Sack as “Athletes’ Rights” reformers, who see athletes as 
employees responsible for a significant portion of the revenue college athletics generated, and as 
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such, deserve a share of the revenue, the right to unionize, and other employee benefits. The ideal 
of amateurism, to these reformers, is simply a cover-up to keep from paying athletes more. College 
athletics participation is seen a right of the talented. Allen Sack himself and Kermit Alexander fit 
into this category as creators of the Center for Athletes’ Rights and Education (CARE). They have 
long argued for a players’ union and a players’ share of the athletics revenue (Byers, 1995). 
Additionally, there is the CARE Faculty Coalition (CARE-FC) co-founded by Ellen Staurowsky 
and Richard Southall. Sack and Staurowsky are notable athletes’ rights reformers, and together 
authored College Athletes for Hire: The Evolution and Legacy of the NCAA’s Amateur Myth 
(1998), as well as numerous individual works.  
Sack’s third category is “Academic Capitalism” reformers, who see athletics as an integral 
part of personal development and higher education, expanding access and providing opportunities 
to thousands. They view commercialism as a healthy byproduct of a strong educational experience 
necessary to continue providing those opportunities and growing the university. These reformers 
uphold the value of amateurism, view athletics participation as a privilege, not a right, and see 
scholarships as gifts more than employment contracts (Sack, 2009).  
At the heart of the issue is whether the NCAA cornerstone philosophy of amateurism is a 
valid ideal and whether the current athletics climate is aligned with that ideal today. Some believe 
amateurism is hypocrisy and that prohibiting payments to athletes violates antitrust law (Gibson, 
2012; Huma & Staurowsky, 2011; Kreher, 2006). Notable critics like Jay Bilas (2017) argue that 
student-athletes are much more ‘athlete’ than ‘student,’ with the pressure to perform on the court 
or field far outweighing the opportunity or expectation to perform in the classroom. Further, 
coaches and administrators are evaluated on athletic performance rather than academic metrics, 
with little to no bonuses tied to academic performance or graduation rate (Miller, 2012). On one 
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hand, amateurism is simply a legal camouflage for universities to avoid a price competition over 
talented athletes. Alternatively, one could argue that amateurism allows the NCAA and its 
members to provide the thousands of opportunities they do, using the revenue surplus to provide 
scholarships and benefits across each university’s collection of sports. A defeat of amateurism 
could kill the sponsorship of non-revenue sports and potentially diminish the popularity of college 
sports, although many critics disagree (Porto, 2016).  
Opponents of amateurism often point to TV revenues and egregiously high coaching 
salaries, but as former NCAA president Myles Brand (2006) said, amateurism reflects the 
participants, not the enterprise. Coaching salaries cannot legally be artificially limited, exposing 
their salaries to the demands of the market (Sparvero & Warner, 2013). Because coaches drive 
significant changes in generated revenue, top coaches demand high salaries on the employment 
market.   
Proponents of amateurism argue that the NCAA’s product receives such high consumer 
demand does not diminish the principles of the enterprise (Osborne, 2014). Moreover, to argue 
that the NCAA and its members limit costs purely to maximize revenue, theoretically creating 
profit for an unidentified group of greedy university puppeteers, is to ignore where the excess 
revenue goes: back to the institutions to support athlete opportunities, scholarships, and other 
benefits for their well-being (Osborne, 2014). If revenue-sport student-athletes are exploited, why 
are they overwhelmingly satisfied with their experiences, as found in a study (Dressler, 2014) of 
football, baseball, and men’s basketball athletes?  
Another important opinion in the debate is that of coaches and administrators, who, while 
they may stand to benefit the most from the current model of amateurism, also know the realities 
of the student-athlete experience better than the public or academicians. Heading into their 2018 
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Men’s Basketball NCAA Final Four game against Loyola-Chicago, Michigan athletic director 
Warde Manuel took exception with the comparison to slavery, calling it an inappropriate analogy 
and noting that “many of the things they need and a lot of what they want are taken care of, not 
just at Michigan but across the board” (Rhoden, 2018), a view shared by Duke Men’s Basketball 
Head Coach Mike Krzyzewski (2018) and Syracuse Athletic Director John Wildhack (2018), 
among others. In simple, economic terms, this study looks to provide an illustration the extent that 
athletes “are taken care of” by looking at athletic department spending in categories related to 
student- well-being.   
 
Legal Cases  
 
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1980 sits squarely in the middle of the pay-for-play debate, 
with a long list of critics believing that NCAA scholarship limitations previously violated or 
currently violate the Act (Berri, 2016; Gibson, 2012; Kreher, 2006; Huma & Staurowky; 2011; 
Noll, 2013; Porto, 2016; Powell, 2013; Sack, 2009). These scholars argue that NCAA scholarships 
limit athlete compensation and essentially eliminate price-competition between its member 
institutions, undoubtedly a collusive measure partially to keep costs low (Gibson, 2012), and many 
have likened the current system to a cartel exploiting athlete labor (Berri, 2016; Blackistone, 2014; 
Byers, 1995; Miller, 2012; Noll, 2013; Powell, 2013).  
Part of the legal analysis in addressing NCAA scholarship limitations in light of the 
Sherman Act is whether the policies are anticompetitive, as they appear on the surface, or 
ultimately procompetitive as the NCAA contends (NCAA v. Board of Regents, 1984; O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, 2015). Efforts to allow free-market forces to reign directly oppose the ‘anticompetitive 
practices’ that promote a (partially) level –and thus more competitive– playing field (Kreher, 2006; 
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Lawrence, 2013). Without direct efforts to level the playing field, sustainable competitive 
advantages quickly win out. More than a century of time and university growth has created 
fundamental competitive advantages related to financial resources, tradition, academic quality, 
location, campus facilities, and more. A few dominant universities and little parity– to a much 
more extreme extent than today– would tremendously harm the NCAA’s product, athletes, and 
almost all member institutions. Nonetheless, some scholars and critics believe highly sought-after 
student athletes should have the right to receive offers on an open market (McCann, 2017). There 
is a balancing act to perform with anticompetitive policies and free-market allowances.  
Dating as far back as NCAA v. Board of Regents in 1984, the courts have traditionally sided 
with the NCAA on the principle of amateurism being procompetitive, as college athletics is a 
product that achieves its value partially based on its collegiate, amateur affiliation as opposed to 
being a lower-level professional league (Gibson, 2012; Kreher, 2006; Porto, 2016; Powell, 2013). 
At least externally, the general momentum, however, has been towards increased expansion of 
athlete rights. Within a group of interrelated antitrust lawsuits, the victories and defeats with each 
case affect the chances of the other cases (McCann, 2017). More than just individual lawsuits, 
these lawsuits behave like one collective legal argument, with many argued by the same firms 
(McCann, 2017).   
In White v. NCAA (2006), the four former college athletes named as plaintiffs only asked 
the courts for an increase in student-athlete compensation up to the cost of attendance, which was 
crucial in that it didn’t threaten the ideal of amateurism, long responsible for causing other antitrust 
suit attempts to falter in court (Gibson, 2012; Noll, 2013; Powell, 2013). The NCAA settled but 
denied wrongdoing, creating a $218 million fund to go towards student-athlete expenses. The 
settlement in White v. NCAA, along with the then-ongoing O’Bannon litigation, applied ample 
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pressure on the NCAA membership to enact legislation to allow scholarships up to the cost of 
attendance, a demand long held by legal minds and academicians alike (Gibson, 2012; Noll, 2013; 
Oriard, 2012; Powell; 2013; Staurowsky, 2012). 
In a related case that gained substantial media attention, the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) had a hearing in 2014 in response to Northwestern University football players, led 
by Kain Colter, pushing for the right to unionize (Berri, 2016). After the regional director initially 
ruled that college athletes were employees with the right to unionize, the NLRB declined to assert 
jurisdiction over the case, deciding that college athletics was not an activity within the scope of 
the National Labor Relations Act, effectively reversing their previous ruling (National Labor 
Relations Board, 2015). As the Board citied, the impact of declaring college athletes to be 
employees could have created instability across the FBS, particularly as the NLRB would only be 
able to assert jurisdiction over the relatively few number of private institutions (NLRB, 2015). 
Such a ruling could raise numerous other challenges, particularly relating to worker’s 
compensation, tax implications, Title IX, compensation, and more, all of which could have been 
cause for a complete reconstruction of the college athletics model. With the substantial threat of 
destabilizing college athletics averted, commissioners from over 30 of the NCAA’s largest 
conferences praised the decision (Berri, 2016; Strauss, 2015).  
The O’Bannon v. NCAA case began in 2009 and only ended in 2015 following a Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that was further appealed by both sides to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
who declined to hear the case. The antitrust case, based upon the use of athletes’ name, image, and 
likeness while limiting compensation, resulted in the preservation of amateurism but also the ruling 
that restricting scholarships to an amount below the cost of attendance was an unreasonable 
restraint of trade (Berkowitz & Perez, 2016; O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2015). Judge Claudia Wilken 
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and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel ruled that the NCAA is “not above the antitrust laws,” 
and that NCAA regulations are subject to a Rule of Reason analysis (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014; 
O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2015, p.26; Tracy & Strauss, 2015;). In this Rule of Reason analysis, the 
courts have agreed with the NCAA in finding that “there is a concrete procompetitive effect in the 
NCAA's commitment to amateurism: namely, that the amateur nature of collegiate sports increases 
their appeal to consumers” (O’Bannon v NCAA, 2015, p.21; Porto, 2016). By the time of the ruling 
requiring compensation up to the cost of attendance, the autonomy conferences had already voted 
to lift the limit up to the full cost of attendance. Ultimately, the O’Bannon decision was another 
victory for the NCAA and the defense of amateurism but it was an exhaustive legal battle adding 
to mounting pressure on the NCAA in relation to the payment of athletes and athlete rights. (Tracy 
& Strauss, 2015).  
Similar to White v. NCAA (2006), the In re NCAA Athlete Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust 
Litigation certified as a class action claims by former college athletes that the failure to provide 
cost of attendance was a violation of antitrust. Initiated as Alston v. NCAA in 2015, the class action 
litigation has received approval of a February 2017 settlement for $208.7 million. That money will 
be distributed to a class of about 40,000 former Division I football, men’s basketball, and women’s 
basketball players who played after March 2010 but did not receive cost of attendance stipends 
that similar college athletes now receive (In re NCAA Athlete Grant-In-Aid. Cap Antitrust 
Litigation, 2015; McCann, 2017).  
Lastly, the ongoing ‘Kessler’ antitrust litigation, Jenkins v. NCAA, seeks to abolish limits 
on compensation for football and men’s basketball players in the Power 5 conferences in favor of 
a completely free market. Such an outcome would completely change the college sports enterprise, 
but the Ninth Circuit decision in O’Bannon (2015) and Judge Wilken, who is scheduled to hear 
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the case in December 2018, have noted that compensation untethered to educational expenses was 
not a viable option. (McCann, 2017; O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2015). NCAA chief legal officer Donald 
Remy said the following about “Kessler”:  
Although the court denied the NCAA and conference motion to end the grant-in-
aid litigation, the court acknowledged that the claims made by the plaintiffs are 
limited by the 9th Circuit’s decision in O’Bannon: pay for play is not an option for 
them as a valid claim (Berkowitz, 2016).  
 
A victory for Jenkins would not create a free market, as McCann (2018) notes, but it would 
provide institutions greater latitude in what they offer athletes. At the core of the case, the NCAA 
will need to show that scholarship limitations are pro-competitive rather than anti-competitive. 
To summarize the legal landscape, the NCAA has come under significant attack over the 
past decade but has largely prevailed as the courts have upheld the ideal of amateurism and the 
subsequent capping of aid at the cost of attendance. Under legal pressure and pressure from the 
public, the NCAA has increased athlete compensation and other benefits within Division I and the 
Power 5, maintaining the line of demarcation at the cost of attendance. This study acknowledges 
the current legal climate surrounding the payment of athletes and seeks to provide to policymakers 
a hardline basis for what benefits college athletes currently receive within the enterprise. 
 
Title IX  
 
A complicating factor in the pay-for-play discussion is Title IX of the 1972 Education 
Amendment Act, which potentially affects any action involving the increased devotion of 
resources to male college athletes. Title IX essentially requires proportionally equitable 
opportunities both in participation and in the quality of opportunities for both genders in 
institutions receiving any federal funding. Factors of compliance are viewed comprehensively and 
include financial aid, participation opportunities, amenities, equipment, competition facilities, 
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travel, game and practice scheduling, staff support, and other athletic benefits that contribute to 
the quality participation experience of both genders (A Policy Interpretation, 1979, George, 1998; 
Title IX of the Education Amendments, 1972). Most institutions are not currently in true 
compliance with Title IX, but the allocation of more dollars to male athletes would likely require 
an equitable increase of dollars devoted to female athletes under Title IX regulations.  
Ellen Staurowsky (2012), however, argues that Title IX would not apply if male athletes 
were paid, because Title IX is based on the assumption that athletic scholarships have an inherent 
educational purpose, and under a pay-for-play model, employment compensation would not 
necessarily be educational in purpose. The opposing argument to this is that Title IX applies when 
education is associated in any way. Therefore, short of football and men’s basketball operating as 
completely separate enterprises with the athletes being solely employees, Title IX would apply 
(Osborne, 2017). The consequences of a shift to pay-for-play are clouded in uncertainty, but the 
shift could have large Title IX ramifications to universities that make a change to pay football and 
men’s basketball athletes.  
 
Additional Consequences of Paid Employment 
 
If football and men’s basketball players were paid directly, a variety of questions would 
come into play, including the taxation of their compensation, the 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status of 
the athletic department, the immigration status of foreign athletes, and employee rights like 
worker’s compensation. With an enterprise as complex and far-reaching as college athletics, any 
significant change can set off a long series of intended and unintended consequences. This study 
does not attempt to predict those consequences, but seeks to provide meaningful data to those 
looking to evaluate the current system in light of those consequences.  
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CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY 
 
Rather than attempting to value collegiate athlete benefits, which can be highly subjective 
and philosophical, this study examined athlete benefits regarding the expenses from athletic 
departments that are directed towards categories of health, safety, and well-being. While many of 
these expenses may not be spent in pure altruism, these categories primarily benefit the student. 
 
Subjects 
 
The population for this study includes the 65 member institutions belonging to the Power 
5 conferences. Surveys were sent to a representative, most commonly a member of their respective 
business office, of those 65 institutions requesting their participation in the study, while assuring 
them of institutional anonymity and an individualized report of their institution’s standing across 
categories compared to their anonymous peers. Of the 65 institutions invited to participate, 51 are 
public institutions, 12 are private institutions, and the University of Pittsburgh and Pennsylvania 
State University are essentially hybrid as ‘state-related’ universities, but both are more commonly 
characterized as public institutions.  
 
Survey Instrument and Collected Data 
 
2016-17 expense figures across various athlete welfare-related categories were collected 
via survey of athletic departments through a representative, most commonly within the business 
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office. The survey requests total athletics expenses and expense figures of 11 specific categories 
that collectively provide an estimate of the percentage of athletic department expenses that are 
devoted to athlete health, safety, and well-being. Five of these requested figures would have been 
already calculated and submitted to the NCAA as part of the NCAA Agreed-Upon Procedures 
(AUP) (noted below with NCAA expense ID’s). These figures provide standards, but even within 
these NCAA-defined expense categories, institutions vary in the expenses they include. The other 
categories were meant to include any relevant expense in that category not already included in one 
of the NCAA-defined categories. Additionally, publically available data like the institution’s most 
recent cost of attendance, EADA-reported unduplicated count of athletes, and Director’s Cup 
rankings was also collected for use in analyzing the data.  
 The survey asks department officials to exclude any expenses related to coach or senior 
administrator salaries, facilities and their maintenance or debt service, event management or bowl 
expenses, recruiting expenses, administrative expenses, or any expenses stemming from business 
operations, licensing, marketing, or fund raising. While it could be argued that portions of those 
expense provide some benefit towards athlete health, safety, and well-being, those expenses are 
excluded in this study in the interest of simplicity and conservativeness. 
The survey generally follows a pattern of describing a requested expense and having a 
comment box for any explanation. Adjustments to the survey responses were made where an 
explanation warranted. The following expense categories were requested through the survey for 
2016-17: 
x Total Athletics Expenses 
 
x Athletic Student Aid (NCAA Expense ID #20) 
o Tuition, fees, room, board, and other aid for the cost of attendance. This figure also 
includes summer school tuition and aid. 
36 
 
o This figure would also include aid given to athletes who are medically inactive or 
those who are have exhausted their eligibility. 
o This figure does not include any federal Pell Grant awards or external scholarships 
 
x Student-Athlete Meals (NCAA Expense ID #39) 
o Non-travel expenses for meals, snacks, supplements, and other nutrition. This does 
not include the amount paid for the board allowance as part of athletic aid.  
 
x Other Nutrition Expenses 
o Any other nutrition-related expenses not included in Student-Athlete Meals (ID 
#39), which may include costs related to fueling stations, dieticians, nutritionists, 
interns/graduate assistants, and other nutrition-related operating expenses. 
 
x Medical Expenses and Insurance (NCAA Expense ID #37) 
o Medical expenses and insurance premiums 
 
x Other Athletic Training and Sports Medicine 
o Expenses paid for GA’s and personnel, operating expenses, and supplies (where 
possible and reasonable to identify). 
o This category could include sport psychologists and/or athletics-employed 
counselors or psychologists if accounted for in this department. 
o This category includes only expenses not already included in Medical Expenses 
and Insurance (ID #37) 
 
x Academic Support 
o Tutor and full-time academic personnel salaries/wages, and other operating 
expenses. 
 
x Sports Equipment, Uniforms, and Supplies (NCAA Expense ID #29) 
o Items that are provided to the teams only, and includes value-in-kind of equipment 
provided by apparel sponsors. Equipment amounts are only those expended from 
current or operating budgets. 
 
x Student-Athlete Development  
o Personnel wages and operating expenses for student-athlete personal, professional, 
and leadership development activities. 
o This category could include sport psychologists and/or athletics-employed 
counselors or psychologists if accounted for in this department. 
 
x Team Travel (NCAA Expense ID #28) 
o Air and ground travel, lodging, meals, and incidentals related to competition, 
including home competition. This does not include post-season bowl expenses.  
 
x Strength and Conditioning 
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o All departmental operating expenses and personnel wages, including GA’s, where 
reasonably identifiable. This expense may also include an outlier salary for a head 
football strength coach.  
 
x Student Assistance Funds (SAF) 
o SAF revenues and expenses 
 
x Expenses from an Endowment 
o Applicable only if the above categories have expenses paid out of an endowment 
and therefore never enter into reported expenses. Any institution with expenses 
from an endowment included those expenses in their applicable expense category. 
 
x The final dataset combines Student-Athlete Meals and Other Nutrition Expenses and also 
combines Medical Expenses/Insurance and Other Athletic Training/Sports Medicine.  
 
x The study ultimately excludes SAF expenses from the calculated total due to potential 
overlap with other categories, but for many institutions there would be no overlap, as they 
are commonly used for separate benefits to athletes (e.g. laptops, reimbursements due to 
hardship, family travel). 
 
 
Collected Externally: 
 
x Total Student-Athletes  
o Unduplicated participation numbers for the participating institutions were collected 
through the EADA website. These counts had any noted male practice players 
removed and were used in calculating the total costs per athlete. 
 
x Total Cost of Attendance 
o Most recent published cost of attendance figures were collected from institutional 
financial aid or registrar sites for both in-state and out-of-state cost of attendance 
estimates. Where applicable, the most expensive housing cost was taken (most 
commonly on-campus) and the least expensive tuition by educational area/degree 
was taken. 
 
x Director’s Cup Standings from 2015-17 
o Final institutional standings in the NACDA Learfield Director’s Cup were collected 
from the NACDA site for 2015, 2016, and 2017 to calculate a three-year average 
Director’s Cup finish. 
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Procedural Notes  
 
The difficulty in studying institutional expenses lies in the variance of how expenses are 
accounted for and actually manifest themselves across institutions. For example of variance 
between institutions, at least one institution included the costs of a fueling station within their 
Student-Athlete Meals category (ID #39) submitted to the NCAA, while many others included this 
expense within the Other Nutrition Expenses category. With institutions that vary wildly in how 
they operate, it is common for expenses to manifest themselves in different categories across 
institutions. For example of how expense categories are frequently connected, athletes who receive 
more than one training table meal per day forgo the value of the additional meals they would 
otherwise receive as an allowance for board within student aid. Universities with a large training 
table program would see a substantial shift of expenses from board allowances (Athletic Aid) to 
Student-Athlete Meals despite both expenses carrying the same function of feeding athletes. How 
the athletic program operates frequently determines which category an equitable expense is 
accounted in.  
In this study, many institutions initially included all or a portion of the costs of the Medical 
Expenses and Insurance category (ID #37) within their Athletic Training and Sports Medicine 
expenses, so any overlap was subtracted from the Athletic Training and Sports Medicine category. 
That overlap was discovered and corrected for every institution through comments in the survey 
or from e-mail correspondence with the institutional representative.  
Because accounting methodology between categories can vary greatly in this way across 
institutions, the individual categories themselves may not serve as great markers for comparison. 
However the sum of these categories should be a strong benchmarking number for comparability. 
Additionally, institutions with high athlete counts will have a deflated expenses per athlete figure 
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that may not match the actual benefits received as those institutions likely have a greater efficiency 
of expenses by providing those benefits to a larger quantity of individuals.  
Lastly, because the individual cost of a full grant-in-aid is not controlled by the athletic 
department and the general athlete experience arguably remains consistent regardless of the total 
amount of aid, summary figures for welfare-related expenses excluding aid have also been 
calculated as an additional benchmarking figure. 
 
Omissions from the Model 
 
There are significant sources of athlete benefits that are not included under the model of 
this study. For one, the total welfare expenses figure does not include NCAA Student Assistance 
Funds applied towards uses outside of these defined expense categories. With average SAF 
expenses over $400,000 or approximately $700-$850 per athlete on average, this is a significant 
potential omission from the welfare figure. Furthermore, athletes often qualify for Pell Grants from 
the government, on top of their athletic aid. The maximum Pell Grant award is $5,815 for 2016-
17 (Dear Colleague Letter GEN-16-01, 20016), an amount that many athletes would qualify for 
and greatly enhances well-being but is not considered in this study as it is not an athletic 
department expense. Additionally, this figure excludes consideration of countless administrators 
and coaches that improve the athlete experience, as well as facility construction, maintenance, and 
debt service payments that provide the elite practice and competition facilities and infrastructure, 
without which quality the athlete experience would be greatly diminished. Even functional group 
expenses that are not explicitly tied to athlete well-being, like compliance and marketing, have a 
significant impact on the actual experience athletes receive.  
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Another omission from the figure is the operating expenses of individual teams, which 
frequently cover minor team-wide needs like hygiene products, snacks provided at the team 
facility, and other supplies that greatly enhance the day-to-day experience and efficiency of the 
athletes. Lastly, there are instances where a functional unit’s expenses are not considered under 
the realm of the athletic department and never enter into these expenses; examples of what this 
might look like at various institutions include an academic center that is managed by the institution, 
an athletic training unit housed within the exercise physiology/kinesiology department, or a 
performance center that is paid for, at least in part, by a sponsor like Nike or Muscle Milk. Some 
institutions provided cost estimates for these externally managed categories, but there may be a 
number of examples where institutions excluded some of these costs.  
These welfare-related expenses are excluded from this analysis for clarity and efficiency 
but should nonetheless be understood to be significant additions, potentially over $1 million for 
many institutions, to a calculation of expenses that primarily serve athlete well-being.   
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CHAPTER IV - RESULTS 
 
 Twenty-one institutions, or 32.3% of the Power 5, participated in the study, providing the 
value of 2016-17 expenses across the named welfare-related expense categories. The sample 
included three private institutions and representation of at least two institutions from each of the 
five conferences. Three institutions reported total athletics expenses of more than $130 million, 
ten over $100 million, and six below $90 million (M = $103,710,648, SD = $21,708,835).  
 
Summary of Welfare Expenses (RQ #1) 
Across the eight defined welfare expense categories (Table 1), institutional totals ranged 
from just under $21 million to just under $45 million, with an average of $29,920,551 (SD = 
$5,437,643). Only four institutional totals fell outside the range of $24 million and $36 million 
(three below, one above).  When examined as a percentage of total athletics expenses, this 
percentage ranged from 22.0% to 42.5%, with an average of 29.5% (SD = 5.9%). Table 1 below 
shows the average and standard deviation within each of the requested categories. Athletic aid and 
team travel were easily the largest welfare expenses across institutions, representing 66.1% of total 
welfare expenses and 19.1% of total athletics expenses.  
In Athletic Aid (NCAA Agreed-upon Procedures Expense ID #20), the study found that 
only two institutions spent under $10 million and only two institutions spent over $17 million, 
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with the average being $13.4 million. Aid represented between 7.4% and 23.1% of total expenses 
for the 21 institutions, with an average institutional percentage of 13.5%.  
Looking at combined nutrition expenses, while the Collegiate & Professional Sports 
Dieticians Association (CPSDA) found that the average nutrition budget of 23 DI institutions was 
$1.3 million of 2015 (CPSDA, 2015), this study found the average 2016-17 nutrition budget among 
the twenty-one Power 5 institutions to be $1.77 million, ranging from below $1 million to above 
$3.5 million. Within the combined Medical/Insurance Expenses (ID #37) and Athletic 
Training/Sports Medicine category, 18 of the 21 institutions reported between $1.9 million and 
$2.9 million in expenses, with an average of $2.4 million.  
For Academic Support spending, institutions had greater variance, with seven reporting 
expenses below $1 million and three reporting expenses above $2 million, with an average of $1.37 
million in expenses for tutors, learning specialists, academic support personal, supplies, and other 
ongoing expenses related to providing academic support services. Again, this figure does not 
include any costs associated with the construction or renovation of academic support centers. In 
this category, two institutions provided estimates, as their academic support is managed by the 
university outside of athletics.  
In the NCAA Agreed-upon Procedures expense category for Sports Equipment, Uniforms, 
and Supplies (ID #29), institutions reported a wide range of expenses, from about $1.4 million to 
$5.1 million, with both an average and median of about $3.05 million. The second largest category, 
Team Travel (ID #28), saw expenses ranging from $3.6 million up to $10.2 million, with an 
average of just under $6.4 million. This category was fairly highly correlated with the number of 
athletes (r = .55) and the total athletics expenses of the institution (r = .62). 
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Within Strength and Conditioning expenses, institutions reported between $600,000 and 
just over $2 million, with an average of over $1.2 million. Again, this category may include an 
outlier salary for the head of football strength and conditioning, but some institutions may carry 
football strength and conditioning expenses within their football team operating budget, and 
therefore may not report those expenses within this category.  
Lastly, Student-Athlete Development was the lowest expense category, averaging close to 
$300,000. Two institutions reported zero within this category, as these expenses were either 
included within Academic Support or tracked separately, while another provided an estimate as 
these expenses were managed outside of athletics. There was a large variance in Student-Athlete 
Development spending, as six institutions reported under $100,000, while four reported over 
$500,000.  
 
Lack of Institutional Consensus on NCAA AUP Figures 
Examining the combined categories, institutions varied significantly in the amount of Other 
Nutrition Expenses reported outside the NCAA AUP category for Student-Athlete Meals. For 
some, all nutrition expenses were included within the NCAA category, while others reported over 
$500,000 in Other Nutrition Expenses. The same trend was found between the NCAA’s Medical 
Expenses and Insurance category and Other Athletic Training and Sports Medicine expenses. For 
two institutions, all costs were included in the NCAA figure. However, for ten institutions, Other 
Athletic Training and Sports Medicine expenses were larger than their NCAA figure, and 14 
institutions reported “Other” expenses of over $1 million. Clearly, the current NCAA expense 
framework lacks a consensus among the membership for what should be included in certain 
figures. 
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Table 1 – Summary Data by Welfare-Related Expense Category 
Welfare Expense Category (2016-17 Expenses) n Mean SD Per SA 
    Athletic Student Aid (ID #20) 21 $13,401,893 $3,319,919 $26,489 
    Team Travel (ID #28) 21 $6,374,613 $1,838,040 $12,415 
    Sports Equip., Uniforms & Supplies (ID #29) 21 $3,065,765 $1,006,951 $6,056 
    Medical/Insur. (ID #37) and Other AT/Sports Med 21 $2,407,001 $456,793 $4,830 
    Student-Athlete Meals (ID #39) and Other Nutrition  21 $1,768,924 $907,050 $3,395 
    Academic Support 21 $1,368,057 $565,906 $2,690 
    Strength and Conditioning 21 $1,238,457 $395,749 $2,403 
    Student-Athlete Development 21 $295,841 $233,949 $562 
Total of Welfare Expense Categories 21 $29,920,551 $5,437,643 $58,840 
Total Athletics Expenses 21 $103,710,648 $21,708,835 $205,863 
          
Welfare-Related Percentage of Total Expenses 21 29.5% 5.9%   
Welfare-Related Expenses per Athlete 21 $58,840  $9,181    
     
Non-Aid Welfare Expense Summary        
Welfare Expenses Excluding Athletic Aid 21 $16,518,657  $3,724,745    
Non-Aid Welfare Percentage of Total Expenses 21 16.1% 2.7%   
Non-Aid Welfare Expenses per Athlete 21 $32,350  $6,447    
     
Other     
Average Athlete Count - EADA (Includes Walk-ons) 21 521 129   
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Figures 1 and 2 show these expenses by institution, for all welfare expense categories and 
for the same expense excluding aid. The institutions in both figures are ordered by their respective 
sum of expenses. To protect the institutions’ anonymity, the order of institutions may change by 
chart (i.e. institution #1 in Figure 1 is not necessarily the same as institution #1 in other figures). 
 
Figure 1 – Categorical Welfare-Related Expenses by Institution 
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Figure 2 – Categorical Non-Aid Welfare Expenses by Institution 
 
 
Welfare-Related Expenses per Athlete (RQ #2) 
 
For 2016-17, the 21 institutions spent an average of $58,840 per athlete (SD = $9,181) in 
the defined welfare expense categories. Figure 3 shows the welfare expenses by category per 
athlete at each institution, ranked from highest to lowest. These totals were fairly consistent across 
universities, with the standard deviation being only 15.6% of the average.  
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Figure 3 – Welfare-Related Expenses per Athlete by Institution 
 
 
Excluding athletic aid, which includes tuition and fees, room, board, books, and the 
additional cost of attendance, institutions still spent an average of $32,350 per athlete (SD = 
$6,447) in expenses tied to well-being across the defined categories.  Figure 4 shows how this 
amount varied across the 21 institutions, ranked from highest to lowest, and the within each 
category.  
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Figure 4 – Non-Aid Welfare-Related Expenses per Athlete by Institution 
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Figure 5 shows a breakdown of the average per-athlete expenses within each of the welfare 
expense categories. 
 
Figure 5 – Breakdown of Average Per-Athlete Welfare Expenses 
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Relationship between Athlete Count and Various Spending Metrics (RQ #3) 
 
Total spending across the defined welfare categories was positively correlated with total 
athletics expenses (r =.451), meaning welfare spending was higher in institutions that spent more 
overall, but total athletics expense was inversely correlated to the welfare percentage of the total 
(r = -.573), meaning that institutions that have more expenses (i.e. generate more revenue) spend 
a lower percentage of their budget on these welfare categories. Presumably, as institutions generate 
more revenue, they increase welfare spending but less than proportionately to the previous welfare 
percentage, resulting in a lower welfare spending percentage.  Figure 6a shows these expenses, 
ranked by total expenses, on the same axis, while Figure 6b shows these same expenses on a 
separate axis to better illustrate the relationship between both. Figure 7 uses a dual axis to show 
the inverse relationship between total expenses and the welfare percentage of total expenses.  
 
Figure 6a (Same Axis) – Total Welfare-Related Expenses by Total Athletics Expenses 
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Figure 6b (Dual Axis) - Total Welfare-Related Expenses by Total Athletics Expenses 
 
 
Figure 7 – Welfare-Related Expense % by Total Expenses 
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Figure 8 shows the welfare category total compared to the count of athletes at the institution 
(r = .632). The number of athletes on campus is clearly strongly associated with the welfare related 
expenses of the institution. Predictably, welfare expenses are higher at institutions with more 
athletes. However, the number of athletes was found to only have a small correlation with the 
welfare percentage of total athletics expenses (r = .241). Additionally, total athletics expenses had 
virtually no correlation to the welfare expenses per athlete (r = .033) 
 
Figure 8 – Welfare-Related Expense Total by Athlete Count 
 
 
Figures 9 and 10 show an even stronger relationship between total athletics expenses and 
the sum of non-aid welfare expenses (r = .702).  
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Figure 9 – Non-Aid Welfare Expenses by Total Athletics Expenses (Scatter Plot) 
 
 
Figure 10 - Non-Aid Welfare Expenses by Total Athletics Expenses (Bar Graph) 
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Predictive Spending Models 
 
 Two regression models were tested to see how institutions spend on total welfare-related 
expenses (Table 2) and on total non-aid welfare expenses (Table 3), based on two independent 
variables: the number of athletes and the institution’s total athletics expenses (revenues). Both 
models imply a base infrastructure spending level from the intercept, a marginal expense per 
athlete, and an additional amount of spending based on the total athletics expenses (resource 
capacity) of the institution. The welfare spending model excluding athletic aid (Table 3) was 
stronger, explaining nearly 63% of the variance in non-aid (more discretionary) welfare spending 
from those two independent variables (p = <.001). This model estimates that the average Power 5 
institution spends about $341,386 on a base welfare infrastructure of support services (p = .910), 
another $11,172 per athlete (p = .02), and then another 10% of its total athletics budget (p =.001) 
on these welfare-related categories excluding scholarships.  
 The other model (Table 2), predicted 47% of the variance in total welfare expenses from 
the same independent variables (p = .003), estimating that institutions total welfare expenses 
would contain a $10.6 million base welfare spending infrastructure, an additional $23,051 per 
athlete (including scholarships), and approximately 7% of the institutions total athletics budget 
(resource capacity). 
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Table 2 - Linear Regression Model of Total Welfare Expenses at Power 5 Institutions 
  β p 
Intercept 10599814 0.056 
Number of Athletes 23051 0.007 
Total Athletics Expenses 0.0705 0.135 
R2= 0.471   
F = 8.034   
p = .003   
 
 
Table 3 - Linear Regression Model of Non-Aid Welfare Expenses at Power 5 Institutions 
  β p 
Intercept 341386 0.910 
Number of Athletes 11172 0.020 
Total Athletics Expenses 0.0999 0.001 
R2= 0.627   
F = 15.11   
p = <.001   
 
Estimating the Expense-side Value of a Full Scholarship (RQ #4) 
 
Taking an institution’s non-aid welfare expenses per athlete and adding the institution’s 
published cost of attendance produces an approximate annual value from an expense standpoint of 
the value of a full grant-in-aid (Table 4). This calculation is not perfect, as athletics will frequently 
make adjustments to this figure as noted earlier, but these adjustments are generally minor. On the 
low end of values for public institutions in this study, this annual figure would equate to $45,000-
$50,000 for an in-state student and around $65,000 for an out-of-state student. On the high end of 
institutional values, this equates to close to $70,000 for an in-state student and up to $92,000 for 
an out-of-state student. The in-state average for this figure is $58,462 (SD = $7,566) and the out-
of-state average is $76,644 (SD = $8,513). For each of the three private institutions in this study, 
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this value would exceed $97,000. This should be seen as a very conservative estimate that excludes 
any intangible value associated with the value of an education or the student-athlete experience, 
such as publicity, coaching, and access to world-class facilities. These values should sufficiently 
serve as conservative annual valuations of being an athlete in the Power 5 receiving a full grant-
in-aid, and should provide a benchmark for discussions related to college athlete well-being, 
compensation, and any pay-for-play model. 
 
 
Figure 11 shows this total value using the in-state cost of attendance across the 18 public 
institutions, ranked from highest to lowest. Figure 12 shows the out-of-state or private institution 
values across the 21 institutions, again ranked from highest to lowest. The average of the 21 
institutions was $81,118 (SD = $11,209). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 -  Approximate Annual Value of a Full Grant-in-Aid in the Power 5 
Tuition 
Type 
n Non-Aid Welfare 
Exp. per Athlete 
Full Cost of 
Attendance* 
Total Cost Value 
    Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Lowest Highest 
In-State 18 $32,773  $6,796  $25,689  $5,319  $58,462 $7,566 $44,006 $70,961 
Out-of-State 18 $32,773  $6,796  $45,272  $7,895  $78,045 $8,760 $63,303 $92,513 
Private 3 N/A N/A N/A N/A $99,561 $3,778 N/A N/A 
Out-of-State 
or Private 21 $32,350  $6,447  $48,768  $11,667  $81,118 $11,209 N/A N/A 
          
*Most recent published Cost of Attendance figure: On-Campus or most expensive housing cost 
and least expensive tuition by area of study, if applicable. 
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Figure 11 – Cost Value of Full Scholarship Participation by Institution – In-State 
 
 
Figure 12 - Cost Value of Full Scholarship Participation by Institution – Out-of--State 
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Relationship between Welfare Expenses and Directors’ Cup Finish (RQ #5) 
 
 Lastly, a regression analysis was used to examine how an institution’s Learfield Directors’ 
Cup finish could be predicted from variables including total athletics expenses, total welfare 
expenses, non-aid welfare institutions, and the number of athletes at the institution. A regression 
analysis using only the institutional total of welfare expenses as the independent variable 
accounted for 19.1% of the variance in institutions’ 3-year average finish in the Directors’ Cup 
from 2015-17 (F(1,19)=4.500, p=0.047), while total athletic expenses alone could explain 35.3% 
of the variance (F(1,19)=10.366, p=0.004), and non-aid welfare expenses alone could explain 
36.3% of the variance (F(1,19)=10.833, p=0.004). Total athletics expenses and the count of 
athletes could together explain 44.6% of the variance (F(2,18)=7.244, p=0.005) in Directors’ Cup 
finish, which was the best and most efficient regression model. That model would estimate that a 
one-spot improvement in Directors’ Cup ranking would be expected from an additional $1.79 
million in total athletics expenses (revenues) or an additional 16 athletes, while the regression 
model from non-aid welfare expenses would estimate that a one-spot improvement in Directors’ 
Cup ranking would be expected from an additional $258,000 in non-aid welfare expenses.  
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Table 5 - Linear Regression Analysis effect on Average Directors' Cup finish 2015-17 
  β F p 
Total Welfare Expenses -1.973E-06 4.500 0.047 
R2= 0.191    
  β F p 
Non-Aid Welfare Expenses -3.878E-06 10.109 0.005 
R2= 0.347    
  β F p 
Total Athletics Expenses -6.708E-07 10.366 0.005 
R2= 0.353    
  β p  
Number of Athletes -0.061 0.099  
Total Athletics Expenses -5.587E-07 0.015  
R2= 0.446    
F = 7.244    
p = .005    
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In individual welfare categories, only Athletic Aid (R2 = 47.0%, p = <.001), Equipment, 
Uniforms, & Supplies (R2 = 19.4%, p = .046), and Student-Athlete Development (R2 = 25.9%, p 
= .018) were significant in single-variable regressions (Table 6). These models would predict a 
one-spot improvement in the Directors’ Cup from either $197,500 in additional Athletic Aid, 
$93,300 in Equipment, Uniforms & Supplies, or $18,760 in Student-Athlete Development 
expenses. 
 
Table 6 - Linear Regression Analysis effect on Average Directors' Cup finish 2015-17 - 
Individual Categories 
  β F p 
Athletic Aid -5.062E-06 16.850 < .001 
R2= 0.470    
  β F p 
Equipment, Uniforms, Supplies -1.072E-05 4.567 0.046 
R2= 0.194    
  β F p 
Student-Athlete Development -5.331E-05 6.638 0.018 
R2= 0.259    
 
Using a multiple regression to analyze the effect of the eight categories on Directors’ Cup 
ranking, five categories were found, together, to predict 71% of the variance (p = .001), which is 
far more than could be predicted by Total Athletics expenses (35%), total athletics expenses and 
athlete count together (45%), or the sum of the 5 categories (57%). The two strongest predictor 
variables were Athletic Aid (p < .001) and Student-Athlete Development expenses (p = .066), 
while the model also implies that institutions that spend more on Strength and Conditioning 
expenses actually perform worse in the Directors’ Cup (Table 7). In the initial model, Team Travel 
and the category for Medical Expenses, Athletic Training, and Sports Medicine had virtually no 
effect on Directors’ Cup finish. After removing those two, Equipment, Uniforms and Supplies did 
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not contribute to the effectiveness of the predictive model and was therefore also eliminated from 
the final model. While Athletic Aid was easily the strongest predictor variable and the highest cost, 
Student-Athlete Development expenses was surprisingly the second most important and has the 
lowest average cost, an implication that either the institutions performing well in the Directors’ 
Cup are the type of institutions that frequently spend more within student-athlete development, or 
that student-athlete development spending may be the most economical way to improve Directors’ 
Cup standing. The table below shows that model’s estimated cost within each category of 
improving one place, and provides a formula to estimate a Power 5 institution’s Directors’ Cup 
finish based on these five expense categories, starting at a base ranking of #119. 
 
Table 7 - Linear Regression Model of Individual Welfare Categories on Directors' Cup Finish 
and Estimated Marginal Cost to Improve One Place 
  β β-Implied Cost p 
Intercept 119.4 119.4 < .0001 
Athletic  Aid -4.53E-06 $220,704  < .001 
Meals and Other Nutrition -6.33E-06 $158,003  0.160 
Academic Support: -1.09E-05 $91,886  0.121 
Strength and Conditioning: 1.43E-05 -$69,701 0.162 
Student-Athlete Development: -3.11E-05 $32,157  0.067 
R2= 0.710    
F = 7.33    
p = .001    
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CHAPTER V - DISCUSSION 
 
In an interview with Duke University head coach Mike Krzyzewski (2018) during the 2018 
NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament media session, “Coach K” was asked about the NCAA’s 
current model of amateurism, to which he expressed frustration with the model and specifically 
with limitations in what athletes are currently allowed to do before they come to the institution. 
Addressing their treatment once they arrive on campus, however, he said “kids get a lot right now. 
In the last three to four years, I’m not sure how much research you’ve done on it, but if you would 
compare what kids get today as compared to four years ago, it’s a dramatic improvement, dramatic 
— not small, dramatic.” [Emphasis added]. While this study doesn’t quantitatively look at how 
these benefits have changed in recent years, we know that changes in NCAA bylaws related to 
nutrition and the added cost of attendance have allowed Power 5 institutions to significantly 
expand the benefits provided to athletes. Syracuse Athletic Director John Wildhack (2018) shared 
Coach K’s sentiment about the quality of athletic experience, "…Between our support-services, 
our strength and conditioning, the training staffs, the quality of coaches, I think we provide a good 
environment. It's something we focus on daily. I tell people that we're here to develop young 
people." This study examined these areas of support to quantify their value with a level of detail 
that had never been done before.  
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The study supports the assertion that athletes receive compensation today, with institutions 
spending an average of almost $30 million within these narrowly defined athlete-centric 
categories, or about $58,700 per athlete. Even removing all athletic aid, institutions still spend 
about $32,350 per athlete in the other seven defined support areas. A student receiving a full 
scholarship receives expense benefits of an average of $58,400 in-state, $78,000 out-of-state, and 
$99,500 in private institutions, a conservative calculation that does not include numerous expenses 
that primarily benefit athlete well-being, including Student Assistance Funds and team operating 
budgets, as well as federal Pell grant awards, marketing efforts, and all other intangible or indirect 
benefits not strictly tied to institutional expenses.  
Additionally, a strong correlation between total expenses and non-aid welfare-related 
spending (r = .701), the more discretionary expense categories, supports the institutional position 
that athlete well-being is a high priority, with support of athletes going beyond just commercial 
interests. Furthermore, a regression model predicted almost 63% of the variance in non-aid welfare 
expenses by applying the count of student athletes and the total expenses of each institution (p 
<.001), showing that discretionary welfare-related spending was largely a product of the number 
of participation opportunities offered and the resource capacity of the institution. This model 
estimated that Power 5 institutions spend an average of $341,386 annually on a baseline non-aid 
welfare infrastructure, an additional $11,172 per athlete in non-scholarship benefits, and have 
resource-based spending on these benefits of another 10% of their total athletics budget. One 
reason the non-aid model was stronger than the model including scholarship aid (R2 = .47, p = 
.003) could be that institutions have less control over the cost of scholarships, which is largely 
outside the control of athletics. The non-aid model focuses on the athlete-centric expenses 
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institutions have more control over, potentially identifying a greater ratio of signal to noise than 
when the significant and less discretionary cost of athletic aid is factored in. 
Both models imply spending patterns that are fairly intuitive but nonetheless significant; 
Power 5 institutions spend on building their welfare infrastructure (regression intercept) and 
supporting athlete needs (marginal expense per athlete), and most likely after those needs have 
been largely met, the marginal return on welfare spending is lower, with discretionary (non-aid) 
resource-based spending being only 10% of resource capacity. This priority order of spending is 
evidenced in the fact that, when ranking the 21 departments by total athletics expenses, the average 
of the bottom third is 64% of the average of the top third, but the same bottom third averages 79% 
of the total welfare related expenses of the top third. If the lower third of departments have 64% 
of the resources but 79% of the welfare-related spending, these categories as a whole clearly have 
higher priority. 
The marginal spending based on resource capacity could be for more desirable and costly 
staff members, traveling via more flights instead of bus rides, hiring additional academic staff and 
athletic trainers beyond what is minimally necessary, providing enhanced fueling stations,  or 
increasing access to training table meals. Regardless, the models imply that providing a base level 
of services and benefits to athletes is the first priority, and after institutions meet those base needs, 
a greater portion of marginal revenues are spent outside the welfare-related categories as these 
institutions likely spend more on recruiting-related expenditures and hiring or retaining key staff 
members or coaches that drive revenue generation. Additionally, these institutions that have passed 
a base level of important athlete welfare services and benefits likely turn to increasing staff to 
account for the increased level of operating, such as directors of operation for sports, and personnel 
within business operations, compliance, marketing, sport administration, and risk management.  
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While non-Power 5 institutions were not included in the study, the study’s results would imply 
that lower-resource mid-major Division I institutions such as Villanova, Gonzaga, Butler, Virginia 
Commonwealth (VCU), and Saint Mary’s, to name a few of the more well-known, likely spend an 
even higher percentage of their budgets than the Power 5 on athlete-centric expenses tied to health 
and well-being. 
 Lastly, the 5-category regression model predicting average Learfield Directors’ Cup finish 
showed that spending within the five categories of Athletic Aid, Meals and Other Nutrition, 
Academic Support, Strength and Conditioning (negative effect), and Student-Athlete 
Development were, together, a much significantly stronger predictor of Directors’ Cup finish 
(71%) than even Total Athletics Expenses and Athlete count, which together could only predict 
44.6% of variance. It isn’t surprising that Athletic Aid would be the most significant predictor 
within those, but it is surprising that Student-Athlete Development expense is the second strongest 
predictor because it was the lowest average expense of the eight tested. The model suggests that 
where institutions allocate their budget matters greatly in Directors’ Cup results, beyond just 
having a large budget and offering many sports, and that institutions looking to improve their 
Directors’ Cup ranking over time would be best served by spending more of their discretionary 
budget on athlete benefits within Student-Athlete Development, Meals and Other Nutrition, and 
Academic Support.  
Few topics in sport have seen such heated public debate as the debate of whether to pay 
college athletes, namely men’s basketball and football players. Past research has frequently been 
more philosophical in nature (Ma et al., 2016; Orleans, 2013; Osborne, 2014; Rishe, 2011; Sack, 
2009; Teich, 2016) and has largely referenced the intangible benefits of college athletics 
participation (Chalfin et al., 2015; Dressler, 2014; Weight et al., 2016), the legal arguments 
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surrounding pay-for-play and scholarship limits in the context of antitrust law (Berri, 2016; 
Gibson, 2012; Huma & Staurowsky, 2011; Kreher, 2006; Miller, 2012; Noll, 2013; Osborne, 2014; 
Porto, 2016; Staurowsky, 2012), or other economic analyses of the college athletics enterprise 
(Dunn, 2013; Hogshead-Makar, 2010; Hesel & Perko, 2010; Lanter & Hawkins, 2013; Lawrence, 
2013; Sparvero & Warner, 2013; Toma, 2010). However, public knowledge of athletics spending 
has been largely limited to individual Freedom of Information Act requests and broad or vague 
reporting categories. Whether viewed as the lavishly overcompensated or the equivalent of modern 
slaves, the public has an intense desire to know how much of athletics spending benefits athletes 
and this study provides a breakdown of those benefits to an extent not done before.  
To date, the courts have held that the principle of amateurism is worth protecting (Gibson, 
2012; Kreher, 2006; O’Bannon v NCAA, 2015), and while the legal right of the NCAA to limit 
compensation to the cost of attendance is debatable and being challenged in Jenkins v NCAA, this 
provides evidence to document the amount and pattern of current spending towards athlete health, 
safety, and well-being within the Power 5 conferences, which do not align with the narrative of 
exploitation. Lastly, moving forward, the study provides a framework for institutions and the 
NCAA to better illustrate how institutional spending supports student-athlete well-being.  
 
Comparison to the NBA G League  
 
Considering that the majority of the pay-for-play debate centers around elite basketball 
players, this study considers an alternative route to the NBA compared to entering college for a 
year. The NBA’s G League allows players to earn a maximum of $26,000, although much higher 
salaries can be earned by playing overseas. For players with two-way contracts between the G 
League and the NBA, a player earns a $75,000 salary while playing in the G League until they are 
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called up to their parent club in the NBA (Windhorst, 2018). For a player who enters the G League 
straight out of high school and earns $26,000 before taxes, this value is a little over half the value 
of even the lowest of the 21 institutions’ total in-state value ($44,006) and right at a third of the 
average out-of-state value ($78,045).  
Under new tax law of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, a single filer who earns $75,000 in 2018 
and uses the $12,000 standard deduction would pay approximately $9,800 in federal taxes, 
depending on other income, deductions, and credits available to them (Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 
2017), resulting in an after-tax income of approximately $65,200, not accounting for state income 
taxes. 
 
Tax Effect on $26,000 G League Salary 
Salary $26,000 
Standard Deduction -$12,000 
Taxable Income $14,000 
Tax Obligation -$1,490 
After-Tax Income $24,510 
 
Tax Effect on $75,000 G League Salary 
Salary $75,000 
Standard Deduction -$12,000 
Taxable Income $63,000 
Tax Obligation -$9,800 
After-Tax Income $65,200 
 
Average NCAA Power 5 Total Annual Cost Value 
 
 
In a comparison to current G League salaries, the cost benefits of attending a Power 5 
institution on full scholarship clearly dwarf the after-tax salary for a player out of high school 
  N  Mean 
In-State 18 $58,462 
Out-of-State 18 $78,045 
Private 3 $99,561 
Value Excluding Aid 21 $32,350 
68 
 
waiting for the NBA draft (~$24,510), and are comparable to what a player would earn after-taxes 
if they’ve been drafted and are playing in the G League (~$65,200).  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
Any study of this natures faces a trade-off between specificity and efficiency, and an 
indicator like total welfare expenses could be a useful indicator in both the quality of the data and 
the efficiency in collecting it from institutions. This study’s framework isn’t perfect given the 
differences in institutions, difficulty in identifying smaller expenses, and the subjectivity of what 
expenses should be included, but it provides a strong conservative estimation of reasonable cost 
benefits and does so with a sample size and level of detail that has never been done before.  
The study showed that the NCAA’s AUP framework for reporting revenues and expenses 
lacks a consensus for what at least two categories are meant to include, lessening the value of the 
current reporting framework altogether. Ideally, this study would inspire greater participation and 
a more efficient expense reporting framework for athlete welfare categories to be created by 
CABMA or revised by the NCAA, providing a level of both transparency to the public and 
anonymity to institutions.  
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